Upcoming Events on Fall 2025:
Matthew Smith (Northeastern University)
"Liberatory Systems, not Structural Domination" Oct 3, C-HIPP 791, 3:30 PMTo call someone ignorant is to insult them. It is not surprising then that much of the philosophical literature on ignorance has focused on its harms. In this paper, I argue that there are morally laudable cases of ignorance qua ignorance. Ignorance, as a kind of epistemic etiquette, protects inquiry from turning into an inquisition, questioning from turning into prying. When we indulge in overcuriosity we risk a range of inquisitive wrongs, we risk failing to give others the respect they are owed not just in how we act towards them, but also in how they figure in our inquiries. Two complications arise, however, in determining how to understand ignorance as epistemic etiquette. First, many examples of hermeneutical injustice rely on the disadvantaged not questioning the status quo, of not being curious. Second, to determine whether one should be ignorant about p may require inquiring into p in the first place. Despite these challenges, I posit epistemic etiquette as a promising resource for distinguishing one class of morally permissible ignorance.
Scott Shapiro (Yale)
"Leibniz’s Dream: Automating legal reasoning with Artificial Intelligence " Oct 16, SCHLAW 121, 3:30 PMIn the 17th Century, the philosopher, mathematician, and lawyer Gottlfried Leibniz envisioned the creation of a *characteristica universalis* and *calculus ratiocinator* that would enable reasoning in law and morals as systematically as in geometry and analysis. His goal was to resolve legal disputes with the precision and clarity with which accountants settle financial discrepancies. “To take pen in hand, sit down at the abacus and, having called in a friend if they want, say to each other: Let us calculate!”
We are now, for the first time in history, positioned to realize Leibniz's dream of automating legal reasoning. The crucial step in this process, I will argue, is the alignment of sophisticated computer science techniques with appropriate types of legal problems. Automating code-based legal reasoning, which relies on explicit statutes and regulations, differs fundamentally from automating case-based reasoning, which depends on precedents and interpretations. I will explore how formal methods and Large Language Models (LLMs) can be utilized to achieve what Leibniz envisioned three centuries ago, effectively transforming the landscape of legal reasoning through the power of modern computational technology.
Barry Loewer (Rutgers University)
"tbd" Oct 24, CLHIPP 791, 3:30 PMMatthew Brown (Southern Illinois University)
"Dictatorship of the Technocrats: Non-Ideal Democratic Legitimacy and Scientific Experts " Nov 14, CLHIPP 791, 3:30 PMThe public role of experts poses a prima facie dilemma for democracy: popular sovereignty or deference to epistemic authority? This issue, which was central in the Dewey-Lippmann debate a century ago, is very much alive, as the current populist attack on expertise demonstrates. The authority of experts had been defended according to a division of labor between facts and values known as “the value-free ideal,” but this ideal has become untenable, renewing the urgency of the question. Contrasting with approaches in philosophy of science that draw on the ideal theories of liberal political philosophy, I propose a non-ideal arrangement that draws on the civic republican tradition, dictatorship of the technocrats, and argue for the democratic legitimacy of this role for scientific experts in a society under conditions like those we currently face.